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ARGUMENT. 
I. New Matter 
A. THE PARTIES' MONTHLY BUDGET. 
Appellee's Brief, in the Statement of Relevant Facts at 11 15 
and 17 describes the parties' monthly expenses offered into 
evidence at trial. 
An examination of Mr. Turner's monthly expenses sets forth a 
claim for house payment in the amount of $797.00 an amount he was 
not incurring at the time of trial (Tr. P. 30 L. 3). 
Mr. Turner's budget actually demonstrates extravagance and 
exaggeration. Turner claims that his food budget is $350.00 per 
month as compared to DiAnn's food budget for 8 people of $800.00 
per month; a clothing budget of $50.00 per month compared to 
DiAnn's of $150.00 per month for eight people; a utility bill which 
he was not incurring at the time of trial in the amount of $100.00 
per month; $150.00 per month to purchase gifts and a $400.00 per 
month car payment. 
Reducing Turner's claimed monthly expenses of $4,713.00 per 
month by his claimed child support obligation of $1,453.00 leaves 
Turner with a monthly budget for one (1) person, (including a house 
payment he doesn't pay) of $3,260.00 per month. DiAnn Turner's 
monthly budget is $2,830.00 for eight people, which she must 
satisfy without alimony and with imputed income. 
1 
Mr. Turner has the ability to pay alimony by reducing his food 
budget and gifts and by looking for a less expensive residence. 
B. Duke Farms. 
Appellee also raises the issue of the value of the Duke Farms 
property and its shares of Wasatch Irrigation stock and claims that 
DiAnn's share of both is worth $108,350.00. While the evidence at 
trial was that the Wasatch Irrigation stock was worth $87,500.00 
(Tr. P. 88) and the Duke Farms was appraised at $454,250.00, the 
evidence at trial also was that Duke Farms was owned by a 
corporation (Tr. Pg. 75, L. 9) and that DiAnn owned 20% of the 
corporation (Tr. Pg. 75, L. 11) and that DiAnn's share was worth 
less than 20% of the appraised value if it could be sold as a 
single unit (Tr. Pg. 75, L. 18). The evidence at trial was that if 
the other 80% majority shareholders refused to develop Duke Farms, 
only a fool would pay $25,000 an acre, not knowing what the other 
80% shareholders would do (Tr. Pg. 76, L. 1-8). DiAnn's share of 
Duke Farms provided no source of money to help her meet her own 
needs or the needs of her children. 
II. APPELLEE'S CLAIM THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHALL THE 
EVIDENCE. 
A. Imputed Income. 
Appellee claims that Appellant failed to marshall the evidence 
in support of the Court's finding and then failed to demonstrate 
that the Court's finding was clearly erroneous. 
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Appellant has marshaled the evidence regarding the imputation 
of income to her. The evidence at trial was that DiAnn was 
basically the maid for seven people (Tr. P. 99 L. 15) and that she 
was no longer able to take the type of hours she had in 1994 when 
she was taking all of the overtime (Tr. P. 96 L. 3-11) . Appellant 
concedes that she has degrees in both education and nursing and 
that she has chosen not to work full-time outside the home and that 
her income from nursing was $29,875.00 in 1995, and that she is 
employable. DiAnn appeals from the Trial Court's clearly erroneous 
finding that she is able to work at a level above that which she is 
currently employed without findings as to the childrens' needs and 
the lack of co-parenting which prevented her from working at her 
historical level. 
The Court's sparse findings are against the clear weight of 
the plain evidence at trial which was that DiAnn no longer had the 
benefit of Mr. Turner's co-parenting, that the children were in 
counseling and one had attempted suicide (Tr. Pg. 98-99) . The 
evidence was that DiAnn needed to work when the children were at 
school and be home when they weren't in order to meet the needs of 
the seven minor children (Tr. Pgs. 96-97). The Trial Court's 
findings were so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence and therefore the finding that DiAnn was 
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able to work at a level above that which she was currently employed 
is clearly erroneous, unfair and an abuse of discretion. 
Mr. Turner attempts to dismiss Appellant's arguments about the 
lack of his co-parenting as a reason to deviate from the Child 
Support Guidelines and not to impute income to DiAnn by claiming 
the children are old enough to help in the home and that, if 
anything, DiAnn should be able to work more, not less, hours as the 
children grow older and the children grow accustomed to not having 
their father reside at home. Turner fails to recognize that the 
only reason DiAnn was able to work the extra hours and shifts 
during the marriage was because of Turner's co-parenting efforts. 
His callous disregard of the childrens' best interests is 
consistent with his extravagant monthly expenses which he claims 
prevent him from having the ability to pay alimony. 
B. The Child Support Award. 
Appellee claims that DiAnn failed to marshall evidence on 
virtually on all issued raised on appeal. He claims that DiAnn's 
arguments are false relative to her claim that the Court failed to 
file a child support worksheet and failed to make adequate findings 
for a child support obligation in excess of six children. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "6" is a child support obligation worksheet 
which was objected to by DiAnn at trial. The Court accepted 
Exhibit "6" into evidence "because of contingencies" (Tr. Pg. 28, 1. 
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18) but failed to make any findings or explain itself regarding any 
contingencies and failed to make any findings as to the application 
of the guidelines for more than six children or the appropriateness 
of Turner's worksheet. Merely because an exhibit is offered and 
admitted into evidence does not mean it is filed within the meaning 
of § 4-912 of the Code of Judicial Administration or that it is 
accurate. As DiAnn argues in her brief, the Court failed to make 
any findings regarding the child support worksheet or its award for 
more than six children and therefore the issue again is not one 
only of erroneous findings, but the lack of adequate and sufficient 
findings to support the ruling. 
C. Alimony. 
Appellee's Statement of Relevant Facts includes the parties' 
monthly income and expenses. It is clear from DiAnn's discussion 
regarding new matter that Turner has expenses that could be pared 
down in order to give him the ability to pay alimony to DiAnn, to-
wit: less expensive housing, gifts, food and credit cards. 
The Court made no findings as to the value of Duke Farms or 
whether DiAnn's interest was divisible or marketable. The evidence 
at trial was that even if DiAnn's share was worth $108,350, there 
was no evidence that she was able to sell or divide her share or 
otherwise control the development or sale of Duke Farms as a whole 
in order to meet her own needs. The Court failed to make any 
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findings whatsoever as to whether or not its decision not to award 
alimony to DiAnn was based, in part, on a finding that Defendant's 
interest in Duke Farm would somehow enable her to meet her own 
needs. There was no evidence whatsoever to support a finding that 
Duke Farms provided any income to DiAnn or that it otherwise 
allowed her meet her own needs. Despite this lack of evidence, the 
Court entered a clearly erroneous finding that DiAnn's interest in 
Duke Farms somehow precluded her from alimony. Once again, the 
Trial Court's Findings are deficient and insufficient. 
D. Pay-out of Equity. 
Turner argues that DiAnn could have refinanced the home and 
paid off Turner's equity, but fails to recognize 1 16 of the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce, wherein "each party is prohibited 
from placing or causing to be placed any lien, mortgage or other 
encumbrance against the home and property described in |^15 above." 
Without alimony and appropriate child support, there was no 
evidence that DiAnn had any ability to otherwise obtain and pay 
over Mr. Turner's equity 
E. The USAA Debt. 
Appellee claims that DiAnn failed to marshall the evidence 
regarding all of the issues from which she appeals. The evidence 
is clear that Turner, who has no house payment and an extravagant 
budget has the ability to pay the USAA debt, the majority of which 
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was incurred after the separation of the parties. In fact, he 
lists payment of the debt in his budget as described in Trial 
Exhibit 4. 
F. Attorney's Fees. 
DiAnn recognizes the Court did make some findings regarding 
its award of attorney's fees. The Court made no findings as 
required by Willey v. Willey, 333 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah 1997) as 
to why it awarded the amount it did or why it refused to award 
DiAnn her requested attorney's fees or how DiAnn could pay her own 
fees,, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys, 
difficulty of the litigation and the efficiency of the attorneys 
presenting their case. The claim of Mr. Turner to a share of Duke 
Farms required considerable attorney's fees that were needlessly 
incurred. Turner's spurious claim was based on cutting a few crops 
of hay or infrequent clearing of ditches at Duke Farms which did 
not enhance its value (TR. P. 73) (R. 102) . 
CONCLUSION 
The crux of DiAnn's appeal is that the trial court failed to 
make adequate and appropriate findings as required by this Court 
and the Utah Supreme Court. Appellee's brief focuses on his claims 
that DiAnn failed to marshall the evidence in support of the 
findings made by the Court and then demonstrate that they were 
clearly erroneous and against the clear weight of the evidence. 
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Other than the finding that DiAnn is able to work at a level above 
that which she is currently employed (which was clearly erroneous 
in the face of the evidence regarding the needs of the children and 
the lack of co-parenting), DiAnn complains that the Court failed to 
enter sufficiently detailed findings regarding the evidence. 
While the finding that DiAnn was able to work at a level above 
which she is currently employed is against the clear weight of the 
evidence and clearly erroneous, the Trial Court failed to make 
sufficient findings regarding its imputation of income to DiAnn, 
child support, its decision not to award alimony, its decision to 
require DiAnn to permit Mr. Turner to benefit from DiAnn's pay down 
of the mortgage and its decision regarding payment of the USAA 
debt and its determination not tpp award DiAnn her requested 
! V 
attorney's fees. vO \ 
DATED this C ^ 7 day of April, 0.998. 
/ Respep/tfully submitted, 
Steven Kuhnhausen 
Joseph F. flfrifici 
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